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ARGUMENT
POINT I
RUSSELL HAS THE STATUTORY CAPACITY NECESSARY
TO REDEEM PROPERTY FROM THE SHERIFF'S SALE BECAUSE
HE IS A SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO A JUDGMENT DEBTOR
Utah's right of redemption statute provides that "[s]ales of real estate under judgments
of foreclosure of mortgages and liens are subject to redemption as in case of sales under
executions generally." Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-6 (1993 Supp). Those who may redeem
property sold subject to redemption, or any part sold separately, include "the following
persons or their successors in interest: (1) the judgment debtor; (2) a creditor having a lien by
judgment or a mortgage on the property sold, or on some share or part thereof, subsequent to
that on which the property was sold." Utah R. Civ. P. 69(j)(l) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff and Appellee Mark L. Rindlesbach ("Rindlesbach") relies on the Court's
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment entered on June 23, 1995 (the
"Order") to argue that the "law of the case" doctrine bars Defendant and Appellant Roger T.
Russell ("Russell") from redeeming two parcels of real property (the "Subject Property")
purchased by Rindlesbach at a sheriff's sale. The Order states, in pertinent part, that "Russell
is not a 'Judgment Debtor' as that term is used in Rule 69(e)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure." However, the Order creates no "law of the case" implications because Russell
does not seek to redeem the Subject Property as a judgment debtor, but as a successor in
interest to Drew William Hansen ("Drew") and Diana M. Hansen ("Diana"), the judgment
debtors. Nowhere in his appellate brief does Rindlesbach define "successor in interest to a
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judgment debtor." Russell submits that the best and most accurate definition of a successor in
interest to a judgment debtor is "one who has acquired or succeeded to the interest of the
judgment debtor in the property . . . " Fortv-Four Hundred East Broadway Co. v. 4400 East
Broadway, 135 Ariz. 265, 660 P.2d 866, 868 (Ct. App. 1982). Russell succeeded to the
interest of Drew and Diana in the Subject Property when he purchased the Subject Property.
Accordingly, the Order in no way affects Russell's statutory capacity to redeem the Subject
Property.
It is critical to note that Rule 69(e)(3) allows only the "judgment debtor" to designate
the order of parcels at a sheriffs sale, while Rule 69(j) allows the judgment debtor or his
successor in interest to redeem. The difference in wording reflects the essential distinction
between the purposes of the two subsections." The "designation of parcels" subsection
provides the judgment debtor an opportunity to maximize the bid, thus reducing or eliminating
a deficiency. On the other hand, the redemption subsection allows the party having an interest
in the property - be it the judgment debtor or a successor in interest - to recover the property
within the redemptive period.
Moreover, as Rindlesbach correctly notes, "the 'law of the case' doctrine is employed
to avoid delay and prevent injustice." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d
42, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Employment of the "law of the case" doctrine to the procedural
setting of this case will not avoid delay and, in fact, will promote injustice. The District
Court's finding that Russell is not a judgment debtor for purposes of Rule 69(e)(3) has no
bearing on whether Russell is a judgment debtor for purposes of determining who may redeem
under Rule 69(j). Indeed, such a finding was neither critical nor necessary to the entry of
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summary judgment granting the relief sought in Rindlesbach's foreclosure complaint. Russell
should not be denied the opportunity to prove at trial that he is entitled to redeem the Subject
Property under Rule 69(j). See Evans v. Stamper, 835 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Wyo. 1992)
(redemption statutes should be liberally construed in favor of right to redeem following
foreclosure).
Rindlesbach argues in his appellate brief, in effect, that successive owners of real
property do not qualify as successors in interest to a judgment debtor under Rule 69(j). That
argument is devoid of legal support. Instead, Rindlesbach attempts to discredit Russell's
reliance on the case of Forty-Four Hundred East Broadway Co. v. 4400 Broadway, 135 Ariz.
265, 660 P.2d 866 (Ct. App. 1982), by claiming that Arizona's right of redemption statute is
broader than Rule 69(j)(l) because it states that property sold subject to redemption may be
redeemed by the "judgment debtor or his successor in interest in the whole or any part of the
property." Rindlesbach claims that Russell is precluded from redeeming the Subject Property
as a successor in interest to a judgment debtor because unlike Arizona's right of redemption
statute, Rule 69(j)(l) does not contain the express language that a judgment debtor or his
successor in interest "in the whole or any part of the property" may redeem property sold
subject to redemption.
Simply put, Russell is a successor in interest to a judgment debtor because he
succeeded to the interest of Drew and Diana in the Subject Property when he purchased the

-4-

Subject Property on contract in April 1991.l Indeed, a strong argument can be made that Rule
69(j)(l) is broader than Arizona's right of redemption statute because persons entitled to
redeem are not limited to successors in interest of a judgment debtor "in the whole or any part
of the property." Russell is a successor in interest to a judgment debtor under Rule 69(j) and
also would qualify under the more specific right of redemption statute in Arizona.
Accordingly, Russell has the statutory capacity to redeem the Subject Property and should be
allowed to do so.
POINT II
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS HAS NO EFFECT ON
EVAN W. HANSEN'S DEALINGS WITH RUSSELL AS AN AGENT OF
DREW AND DIANA NOR DOES IT PREVENT RUSSELL
FROM ASSERTING AN INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
Rindlesbach claims in his appellate brief that Russell essentially asks this Court to
repeal the statute of frauds in seeking specific performance of his contract with Evan W.
Hansen ("Evan") as if the statute of frauds were a rule without exception no matter how
completely lacking in fraud the transaction may be. Russell respectfully requests the Court to
prevent Rindlesbach from turning the statute of frauds on its head and using it as a weapon to
perpetrate a gross injustice against Russell. Indeed, the affidavits of Russell, Dale Hansen
("Dale"), and Brook Hansen ("Brook"), all show that Evan had sold the Subject Property to
Russell for the benefit and with the approval of Drew and Diana. There is more than one
Russell's argument that Rule 69(j)(l) is broader in its application than Arizona's right of redemption
statute also is supported by Perry v. Safety Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Kansas City, 25 Ariz. App. 443, 544
P.2d 267 (1976), a case cited by Rindlesbach in his appellate brief in an attempt to minimize the effect of FortyFour Hundred East Broadway. Perry indicates that a person does not become a successor in interest to a judgment
debtor in Arizona unless he or she acquires a properly acknowledged deed in accordance with Arizona statute. See
id. at 269. In contrast, Utah has no such provision limiting who can be a successor in interest.
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genuine issue of material fact in this case with respect to Russell's dealings with Evan and his
purchase of the Subject Property, thus dictating that Russell have his day in court.
Russell claims that the case of Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982), is
factually similar to that before this Court and defeats Russell's ratification claim. In Bradshaw.
the plaintiffs and one of eight sibling owners of certain property entered into an oral agreement
to sell the plaintiffs the property. However, two of the siblings were not notified of the
agreement at any relevant time and manifested by their actions their disapproval of the
agreement. Indeed, one of the siblings continually stated his objection to the agreement. Drew
and Diana in the instant case not only knew of Evan's agreement to sell the Subject Property
to Russell but, in fact, approved of such sale and did nothing to disaffirm the agreement.
Russell submits that if the facts of the instant case were before the Utah Supreme Court in
Bradshaw, the Supreme Court would have found that Drew and Diana ratified Evan's actions:
"Ratification like original authority need not be express. Any
conduct which indicates assent by the purported principal to
become a party to the transaction or which is justifiable only if
there is ratification is sufficient. Even silence with full knowledge
of the facts may manifest affirmance and thus operate as a
ratification. The person with whom the agent dealt will so
obviously be deceived by assuming the professed agent was
authorized to act as such, that the principal is under a duty to
undeceive him. . . . "
RL at 78 (quoting Moses v. Archie McFarland & Son. 119 Utah 602, 630 P.2d 571, 572-74
(1951)).
Rindlesbach also claims that Russell's claim of ratification violates the statute of frauds
because Evan was not authorized in writing by Drew and Diana to enter into the agreement.
However, as Rindlesbach well knows, there is a statutory limitation on the harshness of the
-6-

statute of frauds. In particular, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 (1995) expressly provides that
"[njothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts to
compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof." It is well
settled that "[cjourts of equity, in establishing the doctrine [of part performance], have not, by
any means, intended to annul the statute of frauds, but only to prevent its being made the
means of perpetrating a fraud." Price v. Llovd. 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767, 772 (Utah 1906).2
Russell's part performance, as presented to the District Court in his affidavit, meets
each of the standards of sufficient performance necessary for part performance, which are as
follows:
First, the oral contract in its terms must be clear and definite;
second, the acts done in performance of the contract must be
equally clear and definite; and third, the acts must be in reliance
on the contract. Such acts in reliance must be such that (a) they
would not have been performed had the contract not existed, and
(b) a failure to perform on the part of the promisor would result
2

Rindlesbach relies heavily on "general" rules taken from the Bradshaw case and improperly treats them
as absolutes. For example, Rindlesbach argues that "[t]he general rule is that one who deals with an agent has the
responsibility to ascertain the agent's authority despite the agent's representations." Bradshaw, 649 P.2d at 78.
This general rule, however, is severely tempered by a more recent case, Garland v. Fleischmann. 831 P.2d 107,
110 (Utah 1992), in which the Utah Supreme Court recognized in no uncertain terms that "[i]t is well established
in the law that a principal is liable for the acts of his agent within the scope of the agent's authority, irrespective
of whether the principal is disclosed or undisclosed." Id. at 110 (emphasis added). The fact that Evan acted in his
own name without disclosing the identities of Drew and Diana "does not preclude liability on the part of the
principal when he is discovered to be such by a third party who has dealt with the agent." Id, Significantly, "[t]his
is true even though the third person dealing with the agent did not learn of the existence of the principal until after
the bargain was completed." IcL In short, the proposition of law espoused in Garland protects persons such as
Russell who deal with agents such as Evan who create "such an appearance of things that it causes a third party
reasonably and prudently to believe that a second party has the power to act on behalf of the first person. Walker
Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones. 672 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 1983).
Rindlesbach also relies on the general rule that "[w]here the law requires the authority to be given in
writing, ratification must also generally be in writing." IcL at 79 (emphasis added). However, like other
transactions which fall under the statute of frauds, the transaction also is subject to escape from the harshness of
the statute of frauds in accordance with the doctrine of part performance. Part performance of the transaction
satisfies the very reason for which the statute of frauds applies at all, which is to prevent a fraud from being
perpetrated.
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in fraud or on the performer who relied, since damages would be
inadequate.
Martin v. ScholL 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983).
The terms of the agreement between Russell and Evan were definite and certain, and
the proposed written document between the parties, although never signed, clearly evidenced
the intent of the parties to consummate the transaction. Russell and Evan specifically described
the real property which Russell agreed to purchase. Evan agreed to sell the Subject Property to
Russell for $115,000 00, and their agreement required Russell to make monthl) paj ments of
$1,000.00 for application to the loan. Russell did in fact make over two years' worth of
monthly payments under the agreement and also paid $8,500.00 in cash and $7,688.92 to
bring property taxes current as required by the agreement. Although Russell has not paid the
entire purchase price, Russell has paid the full redemption amount into court and has averred
his ability, readiness and willingness to fulfill all of his agreed obligations. These facts alone
show that the agreement is certain and definite enough to be specifically enforceable. "[T]he
proper application of [the rule that the essential terms of the contract must be definite] is as a
shield to protect from injustice, and not as a weapon with which to work

. "' Tanner

v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah 1980). Even though the parties' agreement was never
reduced to a signed document, its essential terms have never been disputed.
I ill ther Russell's acts - including payment of about $40,000.00, possession of the
Subject Property, maintenance and improvement of it, and even his rental of pasturage to
others - were clear and definite. Moreover, Russell acted in reliance on the agreement and
absolutely would not have performed as he did had the agreement not existed. Finally, Evan's
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failure to perform the agreement would have resulted in fraud on Russell because (a) Russell
relied to his detriment on Evan's promise to sell the Subject Property and (b) damages would
not compensate Russell for loss of the Subject Property as a unique asset.
It is understood that "[rjeliance may be made in innumerable ways all of which could
refer exclusively to the contract." Id In this case, Russell had the option to keep his horses
elsewhere, but chose to keep his horses on the Subject Property because he owned it.
Moreover, Russell had no reason to improve the Subject Property except that he owned the
Subject Property and wanted to improve its utility and appearance. Further, both Russell and
Evan acknowledged that payment of $1,000.00 per month for rent would be absurd. Finally,
Russell allowed Evan and his wife to stay on the Subject Property by conveying a life estate
interest to Evan, with Russell retaining the fee simple interest in the Subject Property. Because
all of these acts exclusively refer to the purchase agreement, Russell was the owner of the
Subject Property and not merely Evan's tenant.
Like Rindlesbach's reliance on Bradshaw. Rindlesbach's reliance on the cases of
Williams v. Singleton. 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986), and Coombs v. Ouzounian. 24 Utah 2d 39,
465 P.2d 356 (Utah 1970), is equally misplaced because any violation of the statute of frauds
is satisfied by the doctrine of part performance. In Williams and Coombs, the court recognized
that there is no husband-wife exception to the statute of frauds. If any such violation existed in
the case at bar, then the violation was cured by Russell's part performance of his agreement
with Evan. In short, there are numerous "equities taking the case under consideration out of
the statute of frauds." Lee v. Polvhrones, 195 P. 201, 202 (Utah 1921). Russell's agreement
with Evan should be enforced exactly the way Drew and Diana intended.
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Rindlesbach argues that the case of George Fisher, Jr. Family Inter Vivos Revocable
Trust v. Fisher, 907 I\2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), relied on by Russell in his appellate
brief, is far different from the instant case. Russell disagrees. Fisher specifically involved a
statute of frauds issue resolved in favor of part performance of an oral modification to a
written escrow agreement, I he pai t performance of the parties perfot: ming i n idei the oral
modification in Fisher is strikingly similar to that of Russell's part performance in the instant
case. In particular, the parties in Fisher installed sprinkling systems, cleaned and graded the
land, and i»^"f|iV'ii p<m<K ^iiniUrh

Ru^<. M took possession of tlit„J" Suhiect Property ami

improved it by doing such things as mending fences and cleaning up and maintaining the
Subject Property. Further, the terms of the agreement between Russell and Evan are much
more clear and definite than the oral term modifying the underlying written agreement in
Fisher. In Fisher, the payment term was modified simply to require payment under the
agreement "until requested " In contrast, as shown above, the terms of the agreemei it bet w een
Russell and Evan are abundantly clear and definite and warrant specific enforcement.
It is also extremely important to note that the oral modification of the underlying
written agreen

,i Jrisher was binding on both the husband and the wife, the original sellers

of the property in Fisher, even though there is no indication in Fisher that the wife gave
written authorization to her husband as her agent to modify orall) (1le written agreement.
Indeed, this Court expressly affirmed the trial court's finding that the wife "knew of the
modification and acquiesced in the agreement to postpone payments." IdL In short, the doctrine
of part performance saved the oral understanding klvvci ii lln, lurlios from \ iolal miz lite viatiiic
of frauds either directly or indirectly. The same is true in the instant case.
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Russell's affidavit opposing summary judgment described his part performance in
detail. At the very least, his affidavit created a material issue of fact which should have been
reserved for trial.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Russell requests the following relief:
1.

That the District Court's Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

against Defendant Russell be reversed;
2.

That the District Court's Judgment and Decree quieting title in the Subject

Property in favor of Rindlesbach and against Russell be reversed; and
3.

That the action be remanded to the District Court, where Russell may be

accorded a trial on the merits.
DATED this ? W day of December 1996.
JARDINE LINEBAUGH & DUNN
A Professional Corporation
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